Abstract-In this paper, we consider the problem of designing in-vehicle driver-assist systems that warn or override the driver to prevent collisions with a guaranteed probability. The probabilistic nature of the problem naturally arises from many sources of uncertainty, among which the behavior of the surrounding vehicles and the response of the driver to on-board warnings. We formulate this problem as a control problem for uncertain systems under probabilistic safety specifications and leverage the structure of the application domain to reach computationally efficient implementations. Simulations using a naturalistic data set show that the empirical probability of safety is always within 5% of the theoretical value in the case of direct driver override. In the case of on-board warnings, the empirical value is more conservative due primarily to drivers decelerating more strongly than requested. However, the empirical value is greater than or equal to the theoretical value, demonstrating a clear safety benefit.
I. INTRODUCTION
R EAR-END collisions continue to be among the most frequent types of traffic accidents. For instance, 32% of all crashes in the proximity of intersections are rear-end collisions, as reported in the Highway Safety Improvement Program Manual [15] . In response to these startling statistics, a number of automotive companies have already released automated braking systems that, based on on-board sensors, warn the driver and reduce the vehicle's speed when the vehicle approaches an obstacle [3] . Using the ego-vehicle dynamics and relative distance and speed to the obstacle, currently available automated braking systems can compute the least conservative braking timing for collision avoidance in scenarios where the obstacle's speed remains constant [4] . However, in a recent study [33] of the NASS-GES database, NHTSA showed that 56% of all rear-end crashes occur with a preceding vehicle that is decelerating. In particular, the highest percentage of these rear-end crashes (32%) occur with a preceding vehicle that is decelerating at a stop.
In this paper, we focus on scenarios where the preceding vehicle is highly likely to brake, such as in the proximity of an intersection. Providing formal guarantees about collision prevention when the preceding vehicle is braking is still a challenge as demonstrated by the emergency braking test of the Department of Transportation where none of the tested cars was consistently capable of avoiding collisions with a decelerating preceding vehicle [10] .
The need for extending the functionality of active safety systems to cases where the intentions of surrounding vehicles are not known a priori motivates the use of formal model-based approaches for verification and design [17] . These approaches include uncertainty in the model due to the behavior of other traffic participants and design least conservative interventions that guarantee safety (absence of collisions) despite this uncertainty. A possible approach models uncertainty as disturbances that take values in a bounded set. Then, the maximum invariant safe set can be computed, which allows to synthesize a least restrictive control input, that is, the least conservative intervention to prevent a collision (see, for instance, [26] , [27] and the references therein). While often only approximations of the maximum invariant safe set can be computed efficiently (see, for instance, [1] and [22] ), a number of ground transportation systems can be modeled by a special class of systems, called order preserving systems, which allow computationally efficient exact solutions [5] , [6] , [8] , [13] , [28] , [29] . Although this approach guarantees both safety and least restrictive control actions, assuring safety means that preventive interventions are designed to avoid collisions with surrounding vehicles that behave in the worst possible manner.
To overcome the resulting conservatism while still guaranteeing an acceptable safety level, a possible approach is to account for the fact that worst case behaviors occur with a very low probability, so that one can focus on preventing collisions for behaviors around the statistical mean. Guaranteeing safety in this framework means to design preventive interventions that result in avoiding collisions of the time with pre-fixed. Stochastic (hybrid) dynamical systems provide a quite natural model for human driving behavior, as was shown for instance in [12] , [16] , [21] , [30] . Methods to approximate the probability that executions of a stochastic hybrid system enter some set of undesirable states (bad set) were proposed in [2] , [22] , and [23] . While such approaches can be used for danger assessment, they do not provide a safe control strategy. In [9] , using a stochastic differential equation model, a stochastic optimal control approach was proposed to compute the maximal set of initial conditions from which the bad set can be avoided with a given probability . Solving this optimal control problem, however, requires solving a partial differential equation which may not be appropriate for real time implementation.
The methods discussed above guarantee the absence of collisions in of all cases. This is in contrast with other approaches that use stochastic models but do not guarantee that the probability of a collision is less than or equal to a desired level [20] , [25] . In these approaches the probability that the driver's input leads to a collision is computed and safety interventions are then taken if this probability is above a certain threshold.
The main contribution of this paper is an online algorithm that computes a least restrictive control input that guarantees safety (absence of collisions) with probability , i.e., it guarantees safety as long as surrounding vehicles do not use actions from the probability tail of their behavior distribution. The specific application scenario considered in this paper involves only vehicle's longitudinal dynamics, which are known to be input/output order preserving systems, that is, stronger braking leads to lower speed and higher acceleration leads to higher speed [14] . This feature allows us to transform the computationally difficult stochastic problem into a simple deterministic algebraic check that can be performed online using extremal inputs.
We apply the method for designing a driver-assist system that prevents rear-end collisions with a preceding vehicle at stop signs, intersections, or speed bumps. We consider two possible implementations. In the first one, the driver-assist system overrides the driver while in the second one the driver is only warned when deemed necessary to guarantee a probability of safety . In either case, the model of the preceding vehicle is identified from data gathered from vehicles driving in the city of Ann Arbor, MI, USA. A different data set is employed in simulations to emulate the preceding vehicle and validate our algorithm. For the second implementation, we issue a warning through a visual interface that displays the required braking next to the braking the driver is currently applying. Based on our observed data, we model the response of the driver to this warning simply as a random time delay. Fig. 1 . Driver-assist system should prevent rear-end collisions with a PV (collision of type 1). In addition, the ego-vehicle should not enter the study area (intersection or speed bump) at a high velocity (collision of type 2). This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the application scenario and in Section III we introduce the corresponding mathematical model. The theoretical solution is presented in Section IV, followed by the solution algorithm and simulation results for the case with direct driver override in Sections V and VI, respectively. Finally, the case when warnings are issued is described in Section VII.
II. APPLICATION SCENARIO
We consider the scenario of two consecutive vehicles approaching a study area, which can either be a stop sign, speed bump, or a nonsignaled intersection. We assume that the following vehicle (FV) is equipped with a driver-assist system, while the preceding vehicle (PV) is fully human driven. The objective of the driver-assist system, which we seek to design, is to warn the driver and eventually apply automatic brake to mitigate two possible types of "collisions". In a type 1 collision, there is a rear-end collision between the two vehicles while in a type 2 collision, the FV crosses the study area with a velocity higher than a prefixed value. This value will be zero if the study area is a stop sign, while it will be strictly positive if the study area is only a speed bump or an intersection with the right of way. The scenario is depicted in Fig. 1 , in which, for simplicity, we have indicated the study area by a stop sign.
We denote longitudinal position and velocity of PV by and , respectively. Similarly, and are position and velocity of FV, respectively. The longitudinal position of the study area according to a fixed reference frame is represented by (Stop) and the maximum allowable velocity of FV at the study area is denoted by . To keep the system away from type 1 collisions, we establish a minimum allowed distance between the two vehicles, which is denoted by . We consider a second-order model to represent the longitudinal dynamics of both vehicles along their path. In particular, for FV we consider the model (1) in which captures the air drag, models the deceleration due to rolling resistance, models the slope of the road, and is the input that results from the brake or drive forces [24] . This input will be applied by the driver or by the driver-assist system in the case of an override. In particular, we will consider two possible implementations. In the first implementation, the driver-assist system will override the driver as soon as an imminent collision is detected. In the second implementation, the driver-assist system will only issue a warning and the control will be the resulting input applied by the driver in response to that warning.
In order to understand the future motion of the human-driven PV based on the current state, we seek a model that captures typical driving behavior in the proximity of study areas such as speed bumps, non-signaled intersections and stop signs. Therefore, we assume a second-order linear model in the form (2) in which parameters and will be identified from data and is a random variable representing the deviation from the nominal braking profile. Its probability distribution will also be identified from data (see Section VI). In this model, the probability distribution of aims at capturing the variability among ways in which different drivers approach the study areas and also the variability among ways the same driver approaches these study areas. The full deceleration profile depends also on the distance to the study area and the current vehicle velocity. This is motivated by human factors studies which show that deceleration profiles depend on these variables [18] , [19] . In these studies, it was shown that the probability distribution of the average vehicle's deceleration when approaching the study area well captures the variability among drivers. This motivates the choice of as random variable to capture the essentials of the variability among drivers.
Previous works have considered similar applications in which, in contrast to the present paper, was modeled as a bounded disturbance whose bounds were set to capture all possible observed driver braking behaviors [28] .
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Here, we introduce the mathematical model and then provide the formal problem statement.
A. Preliminaries and Mathematical Model
For any set , denotes the closure, its complement and the boundary. Furthermore, is the set of piecewise continuous signals with images in . We represent a continuous system by the collection , where represents the state space, is the set of input values, is the set of disturbance inputs, is the output space, is a vector field representing the system dynamics and finally, is the output map.
The corresponding flow for some is the map satisfying for all , and , and for all . We assume that the flow exists and is continuous with respect to all its arguments.
The system that we consider is the parallel composition of two systems, formally introduced as follows. is input/output order preserving with respect to the disturbance.
3) There exists such that for all . 4) The disturbance input of the system is a -valued random variable with unimodal, invertible, cumulative distribution function .
B. Problem Formulation
Assume we are given an OPSD as defined in the previous section and a subset , called bad set, of its state space. The objective is to keep the system outside of the bad set with a given probability , that is, to keep a safety level . The set of initial conditions such that there exists an open loop control for which this is possible is called the maximal open loop safe set.
Definition 6: Let be an OPSD, be its flow, be the bad set and be given. The maximal open loop safe set is the set Before giving a formal problem statement, let us introduce the assumption that we make on the shape of the bad set . and . In summary, we study systems of two agents, a controlled and an uncontrolled stochastic one. The controlled agent has to prevent entering a bad set of states while also keeping a sufficient separation from the uncontrolled agent (set ).
C. Illustration on the Application Example
Consider the scenario of Section II, the system model is given by , where and are modeling FV and PV, respectively. Hence, where ,
. Notice that we assume that the speed is always non-negative. The output maps are and , i.e., the vehicle positions. The control input values are for some constants and the set of disturbance inputs . The vector fields and are defined in accordance to (1) and (2) as
Finally, represents the time when FV leaves the study area. It can be shown that and are input/output order preserving [14] . This is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The bad set models type 1 and type 2 collisions (Fig. 1) Furthermore, since the flows of and are order preserving with respect to , is order preserving.
IV. PROBLEM SOLUTION
Throughout this section and denotes the OPSD introduced in Section III-B.
We solve Problem 1 in three main steps. First, we show that, thanks to the system being input/output order preserving with respect to the control, the maximal open loop safe set can be represented by , where for all . The interpretation of this result is that if the control cannot prevent of the collisions, then no other control can. This fact dramatically simplifies the problem of computing since it is not required to search for the best control input as this is always given by . Furthermore, since the system is input/output order preserving with respect to the disturbance, we can provide a simple deterministic check that allows to determine whether the system state is in . Finally we prove that we can guarantee a safety level if we apply the control whenever the system state is not in the interior of . We start by defining the -safety capture set: Definition 7: Let . The -safety capture set for a given control input signal , OPSD with flow and bad set is defined as As above, let us define (4) By the properties of the OPSD , it is clear that for all , where " " denotes the partial order on signals, see Example 1. In the following, we state the theoretical results that allow to solve Problem 1. Proofs are provided in [11] .
Theorem 1: For an OPSD , , a bad set satisfying Assumption 1 and we have that if and only if . By Theorem 1, it is clear that from some initial condition we can avoid the set with probability larger than or equal to if the flow corresponding to the input avoids with probability at least . The remaining question is when to 
where is as in Definition 5 and as in (4) . Then, for all , we have that , where denotes the flow of the closed-loop system corresponding to and . The basic idea of the feedback is illustrated in Fig. 3 . Implementing this feedback controller requires an efficient way to check whether the state is in . That is, the next step is to remove the need to integrate the dynamics of all possible disturbances to check whether a given initial condition is in . This problem is addressed by the following Proposition. For notational simplicity, let us define for all , , and : To summarize, by Theorem 2 we can guarantee a prescribed safety level by only overriding the driver input when the system state is on the boundary of the safe set . In general, computation of the set is very demanding. However, exploiting that the system is input/output order preserving with respect to both control and disturbance we can derive via Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 a simple way to check whether the system state is in . We discuss this in detail in the next section.
V. COMPUTATION OF CAPTURE SET AND CONTROL MAP
Based on Theorem 2, if we can calculate the capture set , then the feedback map defined by (5) guarantees a safety level . Using Proposition 1, we have that which means the state is in the capture set if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
These can be easily checked by integrating the system dynamics with the specified control and disturbance input, and , respectively, over the time horizon . As mentioned in Section III, the feedback map acts as a safety supervisor. That is, it overrides the driver when the system's state risks entering the capture set. The block diagram corresponding to this safety supervisor is depicted in Fig. 4 . The current system state and the desired input are given as an input to the supervisor. Using the conditions of (7), the supervisor verifies if the current state is in the closure of the capture set. If yes, is overridden by . For the simulations, this safety supervisor was implemented in discrete time. Pseudo-code is outlined in Algorithm 1. The state of the discretized system at step is denoted by . Future states are computed using Euler forward approximation with a fixed step size . We also define the function (8) All other notations are similar to the continuous-time model. Note that and in (8) depend on the initial condition and the inputs.
Algorithm 1 Safety supervisor

Input:
: current state Fig. 5 shows the path that was used to collect the data for both identifying the parameters of PV model and validating the safety guarantees of Algorithm 1. This path is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan, it is 11 km long, and consists of 30 study areas. The study area is a part of the road at which the driver frequently reduces his/her speed such as intersections, roundabouts, speed bumps or stop signs. For identifying the parameters of the PV model, we collected a total of 125 approaches to study areas, all from the same middle-aged, male driver. The data collected contains both speed and acceleration measurements from on-board sensors and position measurements obtained from GPS (Fig. 6) . We call this data set the test-vehicle data set.
A. Data Collection and Model Identification
Based on this data we assumed a normal distribution for the disturbance input, i.e.,
. We have used the least squares method to calculate the parameters , , and . In particular, using (3b), for we have (9) By replacing in the second equation of (9) with , we obtain . We define the new parameters is the number of all data points, and , and are the measured position, velocity and acceleration of the th data point.
B. Simulation Results on a Naturalistic Data set
Algorithm 1 provides a safety supervisor that, given the model for the preceding vehicle, guarantees that independent from what the driver of the following vehicle does, at most of all scenarios result in a crash. In order to verify this property we tested the algorithm on two different data sets. For the first test, we used the test-vehicle data set described in the previous section. In order to perform model identification and simulations on the same data set we used the cross validation method. For the second test, we collected through radar measurements the position and speed of vehicles that we encountered during a test drive in Ann Arbor on the same path of Fig. 5 . While this data was recorded, drivers were not aware of the ongoing experiment. This led to a data set consisting of 41 approaches to study areas of 41 different vehicles and drivers. This data set is called the radar data set.
In order to validate Algorithm 1, we determined the empirical safety level as follows. For each trial, we randomly and uniformly selected the initial speed of FV, in a range of 5 to 20 meters per second. Similarly we selected uniformly an initial relative position to PV in a range from to 50 meters. The FV would then move with a constant acceleration, chosen also according to a uniform distribution in meters per square second. For the preceding vehicle, we chose for each trial randomly, according to a uniform distribution, either a trajectory from the test-vehicle data set (first test) or from the radar data set (second test). After performing a large number of trials , we computed the empirical safety level , where is the number of collisions encountered during trials. Then we compared the obtained value with . The logic diagram of our tests is shown in Fig. 7 .
As stated above, for the first test we use the fivefold cross-validation method; see, for instance, [7] . Thus, we partition the test-vehicle data set into five groups (each group with 25 trajectories), identify the parameters by solving the minimization problem (10) using the data of 4 groups and run the tests outlined in Fig. 7 on the fifth group, called test group. This way, we compute for each test group the empirical safety level. The results are shown in Table I and indicate that the empirical safety level is close to .
For the second test, we trained the PV model using all 125 trajectories of the test-vehicle data set and for the simulations we randomly and uniformly selected trajectories from the naturalistic radar data set to perform the test outlined in Fig. 7 . Table II shows that the empirical safety level is still very close to the desired one, which also indicates that the identified model of the PV has good generalization ability.
Finally, we compared our safety supervisor based on a stochastic disturbance model with the same supervisor based on a deterministic model as was proposed in [13] and [28] . In the deterministic model, the set of disturbance inputs is , where the lower and upper bounds and correspond to the smallest and largest value of the disturbance within the 125 trajectories of the test-vehicle data set. Fig. 8 shows a comparison of the timing when the supervisors based on the different disturbance models first apply control input. The simulation was performed for a PV trajectory randomly chosen from the test-vehicle data set and the same FV model as for the other simulations was used. Using the deterministic model the safety supervisor overrides the driver sooner than with the stochastic one.
Notice that, in Fig. 8(d)-8(f) , we have used a counter that keeps the control input on for at least 1s whenever the system enters . As we can see from the plots, the number of switches between driver and supervisor input has been reduced significantly in Fig. 8 (f) compared with Fig. 8(e) . One can show that this modification of the control does not affect the safety guarantees.
VII. EXTENSION TO THE CASE WITH HUMAN IN THE LOOP
In the previous sections, we considered the case where the driver-assist system overrides the driver with emergency brake when deemed necessary to ensure the desired probability of safety. In this section, we design a driver-assist system that only warns the driver with the emergency brake level required to keep the desired probability of safety. This allows the driver to apply brake himself/herself, which consequently leads to minimizing automatic brake interferences. We model the human driver as an actuator with time delay, called , which is the time the driver takes to respond to the warning. We extend Algorithm 1 to the case in which we have stochastic "actuator delay" . The distribution of will be identified from experimental data (see Section VII-B for the details). The architecture of this driver-assist system is depicted in Fig. 9 .
A. Extension of Algorithm 1 to Stochastic Actuator Delay
In the following, for simplicity, we consider only rear-end collisions, that is, we assume . The safety supervisor is still in the form of (5), however is not applied directly, but displayed to the driver (Section VII-B). The capture set is computed taking into account that when a control input is issued, it takes time before it can be applied, see Fig. 9 . That is, we have a system in the form of (3a) but with a control delay:
where and denotes the cumulative distribution function of the reaction time. As a consequence, the capture set is given by . If and then increasing requires increasing which means that the driver has to be warned earlier. (11) where is the value of the driver input when the warning is issued. Here, we assume that the value of is constant during the reaction time. In the following proposition we compute an approximation for . Proposition 2: Let and be given and be such that (12) Moreover, let and be independent random variables. Then . The proof of this proposition is provided in [11] . For a given safety level and choice of , we can calculate based on the distribution function and use the result of Theorem 2 with replaced with to obtain a safety supervisor for the case with actuator delay. Notice that is a parameter of this method and affects the approximation of the capture set, see Tables III and IV below. Further investigations are needed to develop a procedure that allows to choose the parameter optimally. The tradeoff between and is illustrated in Fig. 10 . 
B. Identification of Driver's Reaction Time Distribution
In order to determine the distribution function from data, a set of experiments on the test path depicted in Fig. 5 was performed, in which we showed a visual warning to the driver, and measured the time the driver took to press the brake after the warning was issued. These experiments will be referred to as reaction time experiments. In these experiments, we have used Algorithm 1, with and control input in the form of (11) with preset reaction time [32] . All data was collected from the same middle-aged, male driver. Fig. 11 shows the response of this driver [the term of acceleration in (3a)] from onset of the warning, and the frequency of his response time to the warning. We collected a total of 104 of these braking trajectories of the test vehicle starting at the time the warning was issued. Fig. 12 shows the schematic of the Human Machine Interface (HMI) that has been used to show the warning to the driver. This HMI allows the driver to compare his/her acceleration input with the required acceleration in order to help him/her adjust the acceleration of the vehicle.
C. Validation on Naturalistic Data Set
Similar to Section VI-B, where we performed simulations to validate the safety of the supervisor, we compute the empirical safety level (see Fig. 7) , with replaced by and corresponding to different choices of .
We used half of the data collected during the reaction time experiments for model identification, that is, to determine the empirical distribution of . The remaining half of the braking profiles was used during the simulations to replace the fixed input . Thus at each trial we randomly selected a braking profile among the profiles not used for model identification. 1 As TABLE IV  EMPIRICAL SAFETY LEVEL ON THE RADAR DATA SET for the direct override case, we performed two different tests corresponding to different data sets for the preceding vehicle.
In the first test, we used 62 trajectories of the test-vehicle data set for model identification and the rest of the data for the simulations. The empirical safety levels for different values of and are shown in Table III . For the second test, we used the entire test-vehicle data set for model identification and during simulations the trajectories from the radar data set were used for PV. The results of this second experiment are shown in Table IV .
We conclude this section with a discussion of the driver's input model, (11) . Since the rear-end collision situation corresponds to , we compare the FV's positions corresponding to real driver's inputs measured during the reaction time experiments [ Fig. 11(a) ], denoted by , with the FV's positions corresponding to a model input of the form (11), with replaced by 1.5 s, denoted by . This comparison shows that for 98.1% of the trajectories, for all , where corresponds to the length of the observed trajectory. Thus for the reaction time , which satisfies , the human driver managed in 98.1% of the cases to provide at least as much deceleration as the model predicted. This is primarily due to the fact that the driver of the FV would in most cases reduce the acceleration in the vicinity of the intersection already before actively pushing the brakes. This explains the conservatism that we see as the model assumes a constant driver input during the reaction time.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a model-based approach to design driver-assist systems with a guaranteed probability of safety . In particular, we have focused on a case study where a vehicle approaching a stop sign, speed bump or intersection, has to prevent a collision with a preceding vehicle. We modeled driver behavior (both for the preceding and following vehicles) through probabilistic models, in which the probability distributions of unknown parameters were identified from data. Our solution approach leveraged the monotone structure of the dynamics to provide an efficient algorithm for the real-time implementation of the driver-assist system. Simulations on a naturalistic data set demonstrate that the algorithm can indeed guarantee the desired safety level while being substantially less conservative than the deterministic counterpart.
There are many assumptions and simplifications made in this work that should be relaxed in future work. On the algorithmic side, we seek to extend the efficient computation of the probabilistic capture set to more general forms of the bad set and system's dynamics. In these algorithms, we would also like to extend the control input model to actuators with stochastic delays and actuation uncertainty, to capture the possible difficulty a driver has to track the required control input and more accurately model physical limitations. More generally, it will be interesting to extend these approaches to cases where the driver model (both for the vehicle under study and for the surrounding vehicles) is identified and adjusted on-line to provide better adaptation to different drivers, different paths, and different vehicle parameters. Finally, human drivers are often modeled as multimodal systems [21] to take into account fundamentally different dynamical behaviors such as for instance braking and accelerating. An extension of the approach to such a hybrid setting should also be investigated.
